reflects the market's discounting and attitudes towards risk. From the point of view of the empiricist, the deflator embodies the asset pricing model that (s)he is interested in testing and/or estimating its parameters. The conditional expectation is taken with respect to the markets' beliefs, which can be factored into a time-0 prior about the deflated payoff and a likelihood of all potential information flows given possible payoffs. It is standard to assume that the market's prior is correct, in the sense that it coincides with the distribution of payoffs over repetitions of histories. It is also part of standard empirical analysis to assume that the likelihood is correct: the market knows the conditional frequency of all information patterns.
We relax these assumptions and require only that the likelihood function is correct. The market's prior beliefs of deflated time-T * payoffs may differ systematically from the recorded empirical frequency. We show how to manipulate the price histories such that the resulting return measures satisfy simple moment restrictions without having to estimate the market's prior at the beginning of each history, and indeed even without requiring that this prior remains the same across all histories. Effectively, the new return measures filter the data for any biases that may follow from systematic discrepancies between the market's prior and the recorded distribution of deflated payoffs across histories.
This includes situations where the final payoff is the same across all histories, yet the market thought that other outcomes were possible ex ante. Which may reflect mistaken beliefs on the part of the market, or it may simply be that the empiricist collected a biased sample. For instance, other outcomes were reasonably possible ex ante, but did not occur in the empiricist's sample. The latter has become known as the "Peso problem." Another way in which the market's prior and the empirical distribution of payoffs may differ is through "survivorship bias": the sample only includes "winners" (limited-liability contracts with positive time-T * payout).
In a recent paper, Lewellen and Shanken (2000) gave examples of ex-post return predictability when the market had to learn what the true empirical distribution of payouts was going to be, in which case there are obvious discrepancies between ex ante beliefs and ex post realizations. This article develops statistics that can be used to filter return data for the biases induced by the learning in the Lewellen-Shanken paper. More structure on assets is imposed than in the Lewellen-Shanken paper (limited-liability securities); less structure on beliefs is required (neither the prior nor the likelihood function will have to be specified).
It may seem arbitrary to attribute any systematic deviations between market beliefs and the joint empirical distribution of signals and payouts entirely to the market's prior at t = 0, while the likelihood function is assumed to be correct. There are several motivations for this. First, standard mathematical analysis of Bayesian updating implicitly builds on this assumption. Second, knowing the likelihood function is tantamount to being able to read signals correctly. It is plausible that, while acquired in vastly different situations, this skill can be applied successfully in new situations, i.e., when pricing securities with a yet unknown payoff distribution. 1 Third, our approach leads to elegant and easily verifiable restrictions on simple transformations (filters) of pricing data. Such results have yet to be obtained for the case where the market may be mistaken about the likelihood function. Fourth, beliefs have to be correct in some respect, because otherwise there is nothing that links prices to the empirical distribution of signals and payoffs. Without some restriction on beliefs, any price pattern that does not allow for arbitrage opportunities can be explained in terms of some set of beliefs.
The filters all derive from a central property of Bayesian updating first proven here. It states that, when evaluated at the eventual outcome (actual paramater value that generated the series of signals at hand), the inverse of a Bayesian's posterior (one over her/his posterior) is a martingale. Because integrability problems would otherwise emerge, a technical assumption is imposed, referred to as the No Early Exclusion Hypothesis (NEEH). Loosely stated, it means that no potential outcome is ever excluded prior to T * . NEEH translates into a simple restriction on the information flow about limited-liability securities (the class of securities that we derive restrictions for), namely, that the default state never be revealed before T * . Still, the procedures are not sensitive to small but non-negligible probabilities of early revelation of the default state, as would be the case with, e.g., equity contracts (where bankruptcy can generally be announced at any time).
We derive other properties of Bayesian updating that are useful in the study of asset price dynamics. All the properties are simple, but, it should be emphasized, far from obvious. For instance, we will discover that Bayesian posterior densities evaluated at the true parameter value cannot decrease on average, which some would find obvious given the many examples of convergence of Bayesian posteriors. The result, however, does not imply convergence, let alone convergence to the truth. Moreover, the intuition that Bayesian posteriors converge to the truth must not be applied anyway because it is known to be false in general.
2
The article focuses on the econometric theory behind our estimation and testing procedures. A couple of empirical examples are included, for illustrative purposes only. Full-scale empirical implementations of the procedures can be 1 It may be useful to give a nonfinancial example to illustrate the meaning of the restrictions. Imagine an individual who is dropped one day at some random point on earth where (s)he has never been before. (S)he is asked to predict the chance of rain the next day. Of course, because our individual visits the place for the first time, (s)he may not be well informed about the unconditional probability that it would rain the next day. Still, her/his experience with rain elsewhere should lead to a correct update of the prior. (S)he knows that rain is often preceded by a certain kind of clouds. These clouds are far less likely when the next day is rainfree. That is, (s)he knows the likelihood of types of news (type of clouds) given that it would rain the next day, or given that it would not rain the next day. With this information (signal and likelihood) (s)he updates and announces a prediction. Like our financial market, the individual holds a potentially biased prior, determined by her/his own particular experience elsewhere. Like our financial market, (s)he updates her prior using the correct likelihood function, because her/his experience elsewhere is fully relevant in the new situation.
2 See Diaconis and Freedman [1986] .
found in Bondarenko [1998] , Bondarenko and Bossaerts [2000] , and Bossaerts and Hillion [2000] . The remainder of the article is therefore organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the mathematical framework and states the well-known equilibrium requirement that deflated prices should be conditional expectations of future deflated payoffs. Section 3 derives the main mathematical contribution, namely, that inverse posteriors form a martingale process (under NEEH).
Section 4 applies this result to derive restrictions on the deflated prices of digital options and illustrates with data from the experimental IEM market. Section 5 studies general limited-liability securities. Daily, deflated CBOE S&P 500 index call options prices are used in an illustration. Section 6 discusses extensions. Section 7 concludes.
Pricing Environment
We consider histories each of which consists of trading times t = 0, 1, ...T and a terminal date T * > T , say T * = T + 1.
We are interested in studying the pricing of a security at all times prior to T * , based on its payoutW at T At t = 0, the market has some unspecified prior aboutW . As signals arrive to the marketplace, this prior is updated. The accumulated information from the signals prior to and including t will be denoted I t . The collection
t=0 , therefore, has to be interpreted as the information filtration generated by the signals {S t } T * t=0 . The time-t market clearing price is assumed to be measurable with respect to I t . LetP t denote this price. Also, the final payoff, W , is measurable with respect to I T * .
As is standard in asset pricing theory, the market is assumed to set prices to satisfy a particular stochastic Euler equation. LetR t denote the return on the asset:R
The returnR t solves the following stochastic Euler equation:
In this equation, A t is a stochastic discount factor. Its form depends on the asset pricing model at hand. In Lucas'
general equilibrium model (see Lucas [1978] ), A t equals the marginal rate of substitution of aggregate consumption over (t − 1, t):
where c A,t and c A,t−1 denote aggregate consumption at t and t − 1, respectively, and u(·) is the aggregate consumer's period utility function. Usually, A t depends on some parameters that are unknown to the empiricist (in the above, these are the discount coefficient δ and the parameters of the function u(·)), and hence, they will have to be estimated while testing the basic restriction in equation (1). In Rubinstein's log-CAPM, A t takes a particularly simple form:
whereR M t denotes the return on the market portfolio (supply of all assets in the economy). See Rubinstein [1976] . Like in the traditional, static Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), A t does not depend on any unknown parameters.
The model is tested in, e.g., Bossaerts and Hillion [2000] , one of the applications of the procedures presented in this article. It will also be used later in this article to study the pricing of S&P 500 index options.
The expectation in the basic asset pricing restriction (1) has a superscript m. This is to make explicit that expectations are to be taken with respect to the market's subjective beliefs, which may differ from the objective measure that can be estimated consistently from the empirical distribution of realized A t s andR t s. In past econometric work, such discrepancies have not been allowed for. The advantage is that it makes verification of (1) simple when the world is stationary: one merely needs to test whether the sample version of the expectation on the left hand side of (1) is significantly different from 1. But the assumption may require implausibly accurate foresight. As a result, asset pricing models (choices of the stochastic discount factor A t ) may be rejected even if they are otherwise perfectly valid. This article is meant to explore to what extent discrepancies between market beliefs and the objective measure can easily be allowed for. The superscript m makes such discrepancies explicit.
Standard manipulations convert (1) into a form that is more useful for our purposes. Among other things, we will not insist that returns are stationary, and hence we won't need expressions that only involve returns. Also, we will deflate prices using a deflator constructed from the stochastic discount factor A t . We will then work with deflated prices, making any reference to asset pricing models implicit. With deflated prices, the pricing restrictions will look as if the market is risk neutral and does not allow for time value of money (the market really may not be risk neutral and generally will discount for time value of money -all this is implicit in the deflating, however). The advantage is transparency. We can focus on market beliefs, the biases they generate with standard return measures, and construction of alternative return measures that can be restricted under the objective measure.
Write (1) in terms of prices:P
Apply this to the valuations at times T and T * :P
.., A 0 are all in the market's information set at time T , we can as well write:
An analogous operation can be done at any prior point in time (t ≤ T ):
Consequently, if we scale the price at t by the factor A t A t−1 ...A 0 , and refer to the scaled price as P t ,
then the fundamental asset pricing restriction in (4) becomes:
Iterating, one obtains:
with
That is, the scaled time-t price is the conditional expectation of the scaled payoff. The restriction that the market uses the correct likelihood to update its beliefs reflects the idea that the market is able to correctly "read" the information it receives. Hence, we retain the core of what finance empiricists refer to as the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH), namely, that "prices correctly reflect the available information" (see Fama [1970] , [1991] ). One could justify it by claiming that the market is able to rationally determine the link between eventual payouts and signals, even if this is not sufficient to determine the true marginal distribution of the final payouts.
Our study of the dynamics of securities prices in this setting will rely heavily on a simple property of Bayesian posteriors which seems to have gone unnoticed in the literature. Let us first turn to this property.
A Restriction On The Evolution Of Bayesian Beliefs
Because the property we are about to introduce is of interest independent of the specific application in this article, it will be presented in as much generality as possible. Bossaerts [1999] illustrates that it can be used fruitfully to study the pricing of securities other than the limited-liability contracts that are the focus of this paper.
With one exception, we take the setup from the previous subsection. Time is denoted t = 0, 1, 2, ..., T * . At T * , the value of a parameter V is announced. The Bayesian does not know the value of this parameter, but learns from
. Without loss of generality, take V to be continuous. Let λ 0 (·) denote the density corresponding to the time-0 prior about V . We allow the prior to be arbitrary. It can even change from one outcome to another (λ 0 (·) may change across histories).
The notation does not make explicit the possible randomness of the prior, but is chosen to pursue simplicity. We do impose the usual restriction that the "true" probability that governs V is absolutely continuous with respect to the prior. This still allows the prior to put positive weight on outcomes that would never occur. The signal S t may live in an abstract space, but, to simplify things, take it to be a continuous real random variable. Its density given V (i.e., its likelihood), evaluated at s t and v, is denoted
The subscript t allows the likelihood to change with the information prior to time t. In contrast with the prior, we assume that the likelihood is "correct." The meaning of "correct" is: the likelihood function derives from the conditional probability with which signals are factually generated.
Let λ t denote the time-t posterior about V . It is based on the information in I t . λ t (v) can be obtained recursively using Bayes' law:
The posterior is a function. Its value depends on the choice of its argument. For each history, choose the argument to be the realized value of V . This generates the random variable λ t (V ). Because we assume that the prior is absolutely continuous with respect to the actual probability that governs V , λ 0 (V ) > 0, and, hence, λ t (V ) > 0. Let us study changes in the posterior evaluated at V . In particular, what is the expected value of λ t (V ), given I t−1 ? We insist on computing expectations under the "true" probability measure (the one that factually governs all the uncertainty).
This way, we effectively study what an empiricist would observe in historical repetitions of the same environment. Let
E[·]
denote the expectations operator corresponding to the "true" probability measure. As discussed in the previous section, we are looking for restrictions on moments conditional on the final outcome. The expectation conditional on the join of I t−1 and the information in V will be written as follows:
The following may seem obvious, but it isn't.
The lemma merely states that the posterior evaluated at the eventual outcome is not expected to decrease. The significance of this lemma stems from the fact that it obtains independent of the market's prior. If this prior is correct (i.e., coincides with the actual frequency with which V is drawn), then Lemma 3.1 is intuitive. But the lemma obtains independent of any biases in the prior. In particular, the Bayesian may be overly optimistic about certain values of V . Still, optimism does not lead to expected decreases in the posterior. Not even early on, i.e., between t − 1 and t when t T * .
Some readers may claim that Lemma 3.1 is obvious because it would imply that Bayesians eventually recover the true value of V . This does not follow from the lemma. 4 Robust counterexamples of nonconvergence are known.
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Because the intuition of convergence of Bayesian posteriors cannot be used, the lemma is not obvious.
Proof of Lemma 3.1:
From (7) (Bayes' law) and Jensen's inequality, it follows:
Remark: in this derivation, λ t−1 (V ) is implicitly assumed to be in I t−1 . The generalization is straightforward: first condition on knowledge of the prior, then apply the law of iterated expectations. See Bossaerts [1996] for the general proof.
Consider now the inverse of the posterior, 1
Is its behavior restricted somehow? We are interested in conditional expectations of the inverse posterior. These would not be well-defined if the inverse posterior were not integrable in the first place. That is likely to happen if λ t (V ) can become very small. The easiest way to avoid integrability problems is to assume that the time-t posterior is bounded away from zero for v in a subset D of the range of V . We will then work with the truncated random variable 
Turning back to the question of restrictions on the dynamics of the inverse posterior, we have the following lemma, which will be the core mathematical result for the remainder of the paper. 
.
Proof of Lemma 3.2:
From (7) (Bayes' law), it follows:
Lones Smith independently proved a much weaker version of this result. He assumes, among other things, correct priors and independent signals. Moreover, his motivation was entirely different. He was studying optimal investment strategies. See Smith [1996] . 7 By itself, the notation λt(v) does not make clear that we are only interested in the posterior evaluated at the actual outcome for V in each history. λt(v) would mislead one to think that we want the posterior evaluated at a v that is fixed across histories.
Lemma 3.2 provides a fundamental property of Bayesian updating: the inverse of the posterior evaluated at the true parameter value forms a martingale process, provided (i) the Bayesian uses the correct likelihood function, (ii)
the No Early Exclusion Hypothesis (NEEH) holds. The martingale result obtains with respect to the true probability measure, which extends an earlier result of Doob's, who showed that Bayesian posteriors form a martingale process relative to the beliefs expressed by the prior (see Doob [1948] ). It even obtains when including the final outcome V in the information filtration, i.e., when conditioning on the final outcome.
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Let us now use this result in a study of the dynamics of the prices of limited-liability securities. First, consider the simplest ones, namely, digital options.
Price Dynamics For Digital Options

Theory
With the aim of applying the results of the previous section, let V be binary:
Use this to construct a simple security, with deflated payoff
This is the payoff structure of a digital option. If W = 1, one states that the option expires "in the money." If W = 0, the option matures "out of the money." The latter is what we refer to as the default state.
We take the belief structure from the previous section. In particular, we assume that the market's prior over V (hence, W ) is arbitrary, but that the market uses the correct likelihood function. The fundamental pricing equation (6) implies that the (deflated) price of the digital option equals the posterior evaluated at V = 1. With the notation 8 Doob's result only implies that
(no conditioning on the final outcome) and only if the prior is correct.
of the previous section, this means:
A simple application of Lemma 3.1 generates the following useful result.
or equivalently,
This theorem determines the nature of the selection bias that is introduced when conditioning on the "good" outcome (W = 1). The impact is as expected: it causes an upward drift in prices. It should be emphasized that the theorem is not a simple consequence of the fact that the payoff equals 1 at T * , and hence, that the price will ultimately have to increase to 1, in order to avoid arbitrage opportunities. Even if a trader knows that the payoff will be 1 at T * , a priori it is not clear that (s)he will profit when forced to close out positions at any t before T * (t ≤ T < T * ).
Theorem 1 stipulates that (s)he may (it is not an arbitrage opportunity), and will on average. 9 As with Lemma 3.1, the significance of this theorem emerges when it is realized that it holds independent of the prior. Even if the market is excessively optimistic, there will be no temporary price decreases on average. The proof is an obvious application of Lemma 3.1.
The following result can be viewed as a prescription for correction of the selection bias in the previous theorem.
Theorem 2 Provided the No Early Exclusion Hypothesis (NEEH) is satisfied for
Theorem 2 states that inverse prices of winning digital options are a martingale under the true probability and relative to the market's information filtration, when this filtration is augmented with the knowledge that W = 1. The proof is again a straightforward application of a previous lemma, Lemma 3.2.
Theorem 2 characterizes the dynamics of prices of digital options that expire in the money when the market uses the correct likelihood function in updating its beliefs, but may hold otherwise arbitrary priors. Hence, there is another way one can interpret Theorem 2. It proves that there is a hypothesis about market beliefs that can be falsified on samples that hold only "winners." This hypothesis is weaker than the traditional Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH), because it requires that the market have correct beliefs only about the signals it receives conditional on the possible final outcomes, and not about the unconditional probability of the terminal payoff.
It deserves emphasis that Theorem 2 requires the No Early Exclusion Hypothesis (NEEH) only for the state W = 1.
This means that the market must never be revealed at any point up to time T that the option is going to expire out of the money (in which case λ t (1) = 0). In contrast, it may be told early that the option will eventually expire in the money.
Illustration
Theorem 1 implies that rates of returns computed from deflated prices of "winning" digital options will be nonnegative on average. The rate of return is defined in the traditional way:
Theorem 1 states that
Theorem 2 then implies that a simple modification will make the resulting modified rates of return on winning digital options zero on average. The modification essentially filters the (deflated) price series for the selection bias and any biases in the market's prior about the chances that W = 1. The modified rate of return, to be denoted x t , is defined with the future price as basis:
So, Theorem 2 predicts:
Let us illustrate (10) and (12) on a small sample of historical digital option prices. While they are the building blocks of general equilibrium theory (where they are referred to as Arrow-Debreu securities), digital options are not widely traded. One exception is the internet-based Iowa Experimental Market (IEM), organized by the University of Iowa. This is an electronic market in "winner-take-all" contracts (digital options). A few of those contracts derive their payoff from stock price changes of firms in the computer industry. Each month, a new set of contracts is offered.
Contract liquidation values are determined by changes in closing prices of the underlying stock measured from the third Friday of one month to the third Friday of the next month. Trade starts on Monday following the third Friday of the month. In our illustration, we will focus on the digital options that are written on common stock of Microsoft. A comprehensive study of all IEM financial winner-take-all contracts can be found in Bondarenko and Bossaerts [2000] .
Two Microsoft digital options are traded. One, the "High" contract, pays a dollar when Microsoft's next month closing price is above a predetermined cut-off level. The other one, the "Low," pays one dollar in the complementary state. The cut-off level is determined by the exercise price of the closest-at-the-money option written on Microsoft and traded at the CBOE. We will focus on daily closing prices, which are defined to be the last transaction price before midnight, or, if no transaction took place, the previous closing price.
We'll assume risk neutrality and zero discounting. The zero discounting is justified by the fact that participants in IEM have to deposit $500 to participate, and the deposit does not earn any interest. Hence, the opportunity cost to trading in IEM is leaving the $500 on deposit, free of interest. The assumption of risk neutrality may be less orthodox, given the widespread belief that prices of the underlying security (Microsoft stock) reflect risk aversion. But an adequate asset pricing model has yet to be discovered. The point that will become clear here is that risk aversion
is not needed to model features of IEM digital option prices. To put this differently: price dynamics of IEM digital options can readily be explained in terms of biases in the market's prior instead of risk aversion. Once belief biases are filtered out, we eventually obtain evidence for the simplest possible asset pricing model: risk neutrality. This proves that filtering price data for belief biases leads to parsimony in asset price modeling. 10 We will discover the same when studying S&P 500 index options later in this paper. There, we will apply a dynamic asset pricing model to deflate prices and payoffs. But we will find that it does not make a difference. 10 Some readers may be sympathetic to this. Since Microsoft's IPO in the mid-80s, its stock price has increased with more than 40% per year. Few would claim that this is a risk premium. Instead, it is likely that almost the entire return reflects the surprisingly large earnings growth that Microsoft managed to generate. 11 The significance levels in all tests of the paper are based on the t-distribution. There is no reason to suspect violations to the crosssectional independence that would be required to validate the t-distribution, since cross-sections of non-overlapping time series are studied throughout.
The price data are filtered for belief biases if we study winning IEM digital options separately. Each month, one of the two Microsoft digitals expires in-the-money, because they are complementary. So, we have sixteen monthly series of daily rates of return on winning IEM digital options. Across those sixteen months, the average of their mean daily rate of return is 9.7%. With a standard error of 3.7%, this is highly significant. And it is much higher that the average daily rate of return on Microsoft High, because of the bias caused by selecting only the winning contracts.
This confirms (10) (which was a restatement of Theorem 1). Table 1 also displays the average modified daily rate of return. In each month, the digital option that expired in the money is retained, modified rates of return are computed from its price series, and their (time series) mean is computed. Subsequently, the mean modified rates of return across the sixteen months are averaged, and the standard error is computed in the usual fashion. Table 1 documents that the average modified daily rate of return on winning IEM digitals is -3.2%. With a standard error of 2.2%, this number is insignificant. The insignificant -3.2% should be contrasted with the highly significant 9.7% average traditional rate of return on winning IEM digitals. Altogether, this confirms (12) (which is a restatement of Theorem 2), and provides evidence in support of the main hypothesis behind it, that the market uses the right likelihood function to update its beliefs, yet apparently starts the month with a wrong prior compared to the factual experience over the sixteen months.
We now extend our results to general limited-liability securities.
Price Dynamics For General Limited-Liability Securities
Theory
Limited-liability securities have a peculiar payoff pattern. Whether deflated or not, they pay a positive amount except in a default state, where the security pays zero. So, letting W denote their deflated payoff, they have the following payoff structure:
W + is a strictly positive random variable which determines the payoff if the security ends up outside the default state (in options jargon: the security expires "in the money"). Limited-liability securities can be considered "compound lotteries": their payoff is determined by, first, a lottery V which determines whether the default state occurs (V ), and, second, a strictly positive lottery Y which determines the payoff if outside the default state. The payoff on a limited-liability security can therefore be expressed as:
where V ∈ {0, 1} and Y > 0.
From our fundamental asset pricing formula (6), the pricing of limited-liability securities can readily be derived.
For deflated prices and payoffs,
As in the previous section, we will impose on V the belief structure that we introduced when deriving the fundamental property of Bayesian posteriors, Lemma 3.2: the market has an arbitrary prior over V , yet knows the likelihood of signals given V . As for the random variable Y , we will subject it to stricter assumptions.
Assumption 2 (Correct Conditional Expectations (CCE)) The market's expectation about the payoff outside the default state are correct:
Notice that only the conditional mean of the payoff is restricted. The market can have arbitrary priors in any other respect (e.g., conditional variance).
. Just to avoid integrability problems when taking the inverse (1/E[Y |I t , V ]),
assume that there exists > 0 such that
We again study the effect of selecting "winners" only. That is, we condition on the knowledge that W > 0, or, equivalently, V = 1. We will still need the No Early Exclusion Hypothesis (NEEH) for V = 1. The No Early Exclusion Hypothesis implies that the market never until T knows for sure that V = 0. Practically, this means that the default state must never be announced early. This No Early Exclusion of V = 1 obviously limits the empirical scope of our results. For instance, in the case of equity (common stock), one can never exclude the possibility of early revelation of bankruptcy, the default state. Simulations, however, demonstrate that the results we are about the present are robust to the presence of a small probability of early revelation of the default state at any time up to T .
See Bossaerts [1996] .
The setup immediately leads to the following result.
Theorem 3 Assume that the No Early Exclusion Hypothesis (NEEH) holds for V = 1. Assume Correct Conditional
Expectations (CCE). For t = 1, 2, ..., T ,
In the case of a digital option, we derived a martingale result when conditioning on the "good" outcome. For general limited-liability securities, we generate a submartingale result. Translated into returns (computed from deflated prices), this means that the modified rate of return on "winners" (limited-liability securities that mature "in the money") is negative on average:
The modified rate of return is defined as before:
The above could be stated equivalently as follows:
Proof of Theorem 3:
From (15), the assumption of Correct Conditional Expectations, Cauchy's inequality, Lemma 3.2 and the law of iterated expectations, it follows that:
Although empirically less attractive, we can restore the martingale restriction with an alternative assumption.
Theorem 4 Assume that the No Early Exclusion Hypothesis (NEEH) holds for V = 1. Assume Correct Conditional
Expectations (CCE) . If signals S t (t = 1, 2, ..., T ) and the outcome Y are conditionally independent, conditional on V = 1, then:
Equivalently,
In terms of modified returns, this reads as follows:
The independence condition is objectionable. Take equity call options, for instance. Their payoff W derives from the price of the underlying equity. But the latter also signals the likelihood that the call option will expire in the money.
Hence, signals and eventual payoffs are not independent. One case where the assumption of conditional independence does hold is the digital option. There, Y = 1, and, hence, trivially independent of any signal. Conclusion: Theorem 2 is a special case of Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4:
With the assumption of conditional independence of Y and the signals,
Then, amend the proof of Theorem 3, as follows:
There is a way to get a clean result without the objectionable independence assumption. 
Theorem 5 Assume that the No Early Exclusion Hypothesis (NEEH) holds for
Although superfluous because W = 0 outside the event W > 0, one could have conditioned explicitly on W > 0:
(This notation may erroneously give one the impression that the actual outcome of W is conditioned on, though!)
When contrasted with (16), the origin of (17) should be intuitive. In (16), the unweighted modified rate of return is nonpositive on average (subject to some mild restrictions). The weighting in (17) restores the equality. Essentially, securities with a strongly negative modified return will also be those with a low W ; securities with a highly positive modified return will generally record a high W . The former are weighted less; the latter more. This turns the weak inequality into an equality. The fact that a simple weighting scheme corrects the inequality is a beautiful mathematical peculiarity.
Proof of Theorem 5:
The main ingredients to this proof are (i) the law of iterated expectations, (ii) Lemma 3.2:
Illustration
To illustrate the theoretical developments, let us look at a sample of price histories of the S&P500 index option contract (coded SPX) traded at the CBOE. Four-week series of daily prices of call options will be investigated, covering the years 1991-1995. At the start of each series, the option was 2% out of the money and five weeks from expiration. The prices were estimated from closing prices of actually traded put and call options, using the smoothing technique developed in Bondarenko [1998] (constrained convex least squares regression). The technique filters the data for bid-ask bounce and violations of simple arbitrage bounds.
Let us apply two risk adjustment models. From (5), this is done by deflating prices and payoffs before computing return measures. The first asset pricing model is simple: risk neutrality. In that case, the cumulative return on one-day riskfree securities is the appropriate deflator. To proxy for the one-day riskfree rate, let us use the threemonth Treasury bill rate. Our second asset pricing model is more sophisticated. We take Rubinstein's log-CAPM. See Rubinstein [1976] . In that case, the stochastic discount factor equals the inverse return on the market portfolio and the scaling factor used to compute deflated prices and payoffs is the inverse of the cumulative return on the market portfolio. See equation (3). We take the S&P 500 index as a proxy of the market portfolio. As a model for risk adjustment, Rubinstein's model comes in handy, because it generates a deflator that is parameter-free.
Before we look at the results, we should remind ourselves of a standard pricing anomaly in options markets, namely, the smile effect, and discuss its relationship with potential results from the exercises we are about to perform. The smile effect concerns the pricing of out-of-the-money options relative to in-the-money options. Evidently, out-of-themoney options are far more expensive compared to at-the-money options when evaluated against a standard option pricing model, say, Black-Scholes. The mark-up increases with the extent to which the option is out of the money.
This effect could be explained in two not necessarily mutually exclusive ways. First, the smile effect could be the result of deviations between actual market expectations and the expectations implicit in Black-Scholes, namely, lognormal payoffs on the underlying security. Second, the smile effect could be attributed to differences between the market's adjustment for risk and the preference model implicit in Black-Scholes, namely power utility. Incidentally, Rubinstein's log-CAPM derives from a particular member of the family of power utility (logarithmic utility).
In the statistical exercises we are about to perform, we ask a related but different question: is there a smile effect even in realized risk-adjusted option returns? That is, does the risk-adjusted performance of options increase with moneyness, effectively revealing that the more an option is out of the money, the more the option is overpriced?
If we find such a smile effect in the realized risk-adjusted returns, there could be two explanations as well. The first is the same as for the standard smile effect: our model of risk adjustment may differ from the one used by the market.
The second potential explanation is very different. It could be that the market's ex ante beliefs were wrong, i.e., did not correctly predict the historical risk-adjusted performance. Under the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH), and provided that our model for risk adjustment is correct, this would be readily inferred from abnormal risk-adjusted returns computed in the standard way across all options. If we allow markets to have potentially biased priors about the chances that options expire in the money, as in the belief structure that we have maintained in this article, then we should use either risk adjusted modified returns or weighted risk adjusted modified returns across winners only.
The former should be strictly negative on average and the latter should not be different from zero.
Notice the difference with traditional investigations of the smile effect. These could discover that the empiricist's model of beliefs did not match the market's. But they won't imply anything about the correctness of market beliefs relative to the historical record. Table 2 displays several return measures for both asset pricing models. Let us first look at the average daily standard rate of return (daily deflated price change divided by previous day's deflated closing price). Under the assumption of risk neutrality, the average daily return based on deflated prices (which is really the average return in excess of the riskfree rate) equals a surprising -2.5%. Not only is this number high in absolute value, it is also very significant. The finding relates to the smile effect. The options in our dataset where mostly out of the money, and hence, relatively expensive. What we document here is that these out-of-the-money options were too expensive even relative to historically realized payoffs. This evidence is certainly not consistent with the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH).
Even if we adjust for risk on the basis of Rubinstein's log-CAPM, we still observe overpricing. Table 2 documents that the average return (based on deflated prices) is also -2.5% per day, and highly significant. That is, we reject EMH when adjusting for risk with a model that would generate Black-Scholes if market beliefs about future payoffs were lognormal. Again, our results are different from, but complementary to, the usual smile effect, which states that out-of-the-money options were too expensive relative to at-the-money options and Black-Scholes. We find that out-of-the money options were too expensive relative to historical risk-adjusted payoffs as well.
Notice that we pooled the time series of daily returns to obtain one large sample. In Table 1 , we manipulated the data differently. There, we computed a time series mean for each history, and then took cross-sectional averages. The two procedures are equivalent.
With the statistics from the previous subsection, we can investigate whether the mispricing of the S&P 500 options is attributable to biases in the market's prior about the chances that these options would expire in the money. There are two possible tests, both based on the modified rate of return of winning options (options that did expire in the money). First, there is the restriction in (16) that the modified rate of return should be negative on average. Second, there is the restriction in (17) that the mean weighted modified rate of return should be zero.
Whether we adjust prices based on risk neutrality (top panel of Table 2 ) or Rubinstein's log-CAPM (bottom panel of Table 2 ), we obtain evidence consistent with the belief model behind our statistics. In both cases, the modified rate of return is significantly negative and the weighted modified rate of return is insignificantly different from zero.
The latter cannot be attributed to the noise that is introduced when weighting the modified rate of return with the final payoff (properly deflated): Table 2 demonstrates that the weighted standard rate of return is always significantly positive. That is, if we use a closely related but inappropriate performance measure, namely, the weighted standard rate of return, we reject. In fact, in both cases, the weighted standard rate of return is significantly positive, which is plainly the result of our selection bias: the statistics are computed only from prices of options that expired in the money.
Incidentally, we do not discern much of a selection bias in the average (unweighted) standard rate of return of winning options. Evidently, selection bias is not strong enough to overcome the significantly negative average return on all options (including losers). In fact, even if our belief model is correct, we cannot sign the average rate of return on winners anyway. For general limited-liability securities, there is no analogous result to Theorem 1 (which obtains for digital options only). When signals are independent from final payoffs conditional on the option's expiring in the money, however, Jensen's inequality and Theorem 4 do imply the analogous result to Theorem 1. Of course, the independence condition is objectionable in the case of S&P 500 index options, where the level of the index signals both the chance that the option expires in the money and its payoff given that it expires in the money.
In summary, our belief model explains the dismal historical average rate of return on out-of-the-money options, whether we use a simple asset pricing model (risk neutrality) or a more complex one (Rubinstein's log-CAPM) . This means that all of the -2.5% negative daily return (whether adjusted for risk or not) is attributable to historical biases in the market's priors about the chances that these S&P500 options were to expire in the money over the period 1991-1995.
When we project the return on the options onto their moneyness, we can get a closer view of the smile effect. The usual claim is not only that out-of-the-money options are overpriced, but also that the overpricing increases as the strike price increases relative to the index level (for call options). Confirming this claim, we find that the historical performance of options worsened as the strike price increases relative to the index level. See the OLS projection results in Table 2 . Risk adjustment has no impact.
Our belief model cannot explain this. Table 2 documents that the weighted average modified rate of return for winners still increases significantly with moneyness. In fact, when we assume risk neutrality, the results get even worse.
Further investigation of the data indicate that the anomaly is created entirely by a small number of observations where the option is more than 2% in the money (anywhere between 2% and 12%). When discarding these observations, our belief model explains the data. Adjustment for risk appears not to be necessary. This is documented in Table 3 .
It reproduces part of Table 2 for the subsample of daily observations where the options were at most 2% in the money.
The trimming reduces the sample size by 3% (for the sample of all options) and 7% (for the sample of options that expired in the money). The results are essentially identical to those for the full sample, except for the OLS estimates in the projections of the weighted modified rate of return onto the moneyness. The latter all become insignificant.
Which means that the significance of the projection coefficients in Table 2 for weighted modified rates of return was caused entirely by a small subset of observations where the options were more than 2% in the money.
It cannot readily be asserted that our belief model improves the OLS estimates because the weighting of the modified return with the final payoff introduces noise and hence, lowers the power. To see this, Table 3 also provides OLS projection results for the standard return weighted with the final payoff. While insignificant, the slope coefficients are large. Moreover, the intercepts are significantly negative (even if only at the 5% rather than 1% level). That is, when weighting the wrong performance measure (the standard rate of return), we reject.
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the OLS projection results reported in Table 3 for Rubinstein's log-CAPM. The top panel displays the scatter plot and OLS line for the daily returns of all the options (when they were less than 2% in the money). The bottom panel displays the same for the daily weighted modified returns of only the options that expired in-the-money (but when they were less than 2% in the money). The difference is pronounced.
Consequently, our belief model captures the price behavior of out-of-the-money and near-the-money SPX options over the period 1991-1995 fairly well. The remarkable finding is that these results obtain with minimal asset pricing theory. We find hardly noticeable effects when moving from risk neutrality to Rubinstein's log-CAPM. This does not necessarily imply that the market did not impose a risk premium. It only establishes that return patterns caused by belief biases and subsequent belief updating were far more significant over the period 1991-1995. 12 One wonders why our belief model breaks down when the options move beyond 2% moneyness and all the way to 12% moneyness. Further inspection reveals no evidence of clustering in time, a standard source of mis-specification.
Instead, the following could be conjectured. When close to expiration and far in the money, the option payoff is almost entirely driven by the expected index level at expiration, and less by the possibility that the option might expire out of the money. In that case, small deviations from the hypothesis of Correct Conditional Expectations (CCE) may have a bigger effect on pricing, and hence, mispricing because of violations of CCE are more easily detected. Still, the sample may be too small (34 observations out of the full sample of 1102) to jump to conclusions.
Further Extensions
Estimating Preference Parameters
In the previous section, we took a simple but nontrivial asset pricing model to deflate prices and payoffs, namely, Rubinstein's log-CAPM. The stochastic discount factor for this model, and hence, the price deflator, is parameterfree. In general, the deflator involves preference parameters (e.g., risk aversion coefficient) and one is often interested in estimating these parameters along with a test of the pricing model.
As a straightforward generalization of the procedures in Hansen and Singleton [1982] , one can obtain estimates of preference parameters as the values that best fit the theory. For instance, assume one uses Lucas' stochastic discount factor, equation (2), with power utility as the choice for the period-utility function. In that case, the stochastic discount factor equals
all t. Here, γ equals minus the coefficient of risk aversion. As before, c A,t denotes the time-t aggregate consumption.
One can then construct a test of, say, Theorem 5 by finding the values of the parameters δ and γ that minimize the distance of a set of moment conditions from zero.
The moment conditions derive from the general restriction in the theorem:
To make the dependence on the parameters explicit, apply (5):
Here,P t denotes the raw (nondeflated) time-t price, andW denotes the raw time-T * payoff. Then replace the stochastic discount factors using (18):
Again, this equation is used to generate a set of moment conditions. The distance of the sample version of the moments is minimized in order to obtain parameter estimates. With the right distance measure, the minimum distance is asymptotically χ 2 -distributed. See Hanesn and Singleton [1982] .
Restriction On Losers
Until now, we have shown how our belief structure restricts the the price pattern of "winning" securities. One obviously wonders whether it restricts the prices of "losing" securities (i.e., those that end in the default state).
Subject to conditions on the nature of the prior of the market, the answer is affirmative. However, restrictions obtain only when investigating the return series in reverse time. They again follow from a general result about the evolution of Bayesian posteriors. Now, however, the prior has to be random. More specifically, the distribution of priors has to be noninformative.
The analysis is complex, not only because time is to be reversed, but also because the notion of a noninformative prior is subtle. Therefore, the analysis is not included here. The interested reader may consult Bossaerts [1996] .
Conclusion
This article essentially showed that the key assumption behind all of empirical finance, namely, the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH), is unnecessarily strong. It derived a novel property for Bayesian posteriors, and from it, a number of statistics that can be used to test asset pricing theory on limited-liability securities prices when the market is not assumed to know the correct probability of the default state. Still, the market is required to update its beliefs on the basis of the correct likelihood function (of signals given the future payout).
This article's empirical illustrations, as well as the empirical tests in Bondarenko [1998] , Bondarenko and Bossaerts [2000] and Bossaerts and Hillion [2000] demonstrate that the new belief model is capable of capturing the salient features of historical returns. In the process, only simple asset pricing models appear to be required in order to account for risk premia, such as Rubinstein's log-CAPM. This counters the recent tendency to use increasingly sophisticated asset pricing models. The success of the belief model indicates that it may be more fruitful to attempt to explain why market priors often appear to be biased. This may not just reflect historical accident, but perhaps purposeful biasing in order to obtain robustness in decision making, as suggested by the analysis of, e.g., Cagetti, Hansen, Sargent and Williams [2000] . 
Remarks:
To compute the modified rate of return, the end-of-period price is used as basis; N is the number of time series (each is one month of end-of-day prices). The averages are computed as the cross-sectional average of the time series mean daily rate of return or modified rate of return. Standard errors in parentheses. * : significant at the 5% level; * * : significant at the 1% level. Remarks: The table displays statistics computed from daily closing prices of SPX option contracts that were 2% out of the money five weeks before expiration. The sample covers the period January 11, 1991 till December 7, 1995. At all times, the nearest-maturity contract with between five and one weeks till expiration is followed. Two asset pricing models are used to deflate prices: risk neutrality and Rubinstein's log-CAPM model. Modified rates of return are computed based on the end-of-period price; Weighted rates of return are returns multiplied by the (deflated) payoff on the security at maturity. N is the number of observations. Intercept and Slope are for OLS projections of returns onto moneyness (logarithm of ratio of index level divided by strike price). Standard errors in parentheses. * : significant at the 5% level; * * : significant at the 1% level. out of the money five weeks before expiration. The sample covers the period January 11, 1991 till December 7, 1995.
At all times, the nearest-maturity contract with between five and one weeks till expiration is followed. Unlike in Table 2 , only days are included when the options were less than 2% in the money. Two asset pricing models are used to deflate prices: risk neutrality and Rubinstein's log-CAPM model. Modified rates of return are computed based on the end-of-period price; Weighted rates of return are returns multiplied by the (deflated) payoff on the security at maturity. N is the number of observations. Intercept and Slope are for OLS projections of returns onto moneyness (logarithm of ratio of index level divided by strike price). Standard errors in parentheses. * : significant at the 5% level; * * : significant at the 1% level. Table 3 .
